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Abstract	This	article	argues	that	the	political	exclusion	of	displaced	people	living	within	states	under	a	variety	of	humanitarian	and	policy	categories	are	simultaneously	constitutive	of	mainstream	political	belonging	and	social	belonging	for	those	excluded.	Based	on	long	term	research-engagement	with	displacement	in	Georgia,	Jordan	and	Sudan,	we	analyse	situations	where	an	initial	crisis-based	humanitarian	status	becomes	protracted,	and	in	which	people	are	labelled	forced	migrants	as	well	as	citizens,	giving	rise	to	tensions	with	the	mainstream	but	also	creating	social	identities	that	foster	belonging	from	experiences	of	exclusion.	By	analysing	these	processes	as	‘abjection’	–	forms	of	state	control	and	boundary-making	that	exclude	members	from	the	very	thing	that	requires	their	inclusion	–		we	show	that	a	type	of	ambiguous	citizenship	emerges	from	protracted	situations	of	displacement.	Simultaneously,	people	‘out	of	place’	but	within	a	state	may	exclude	themselves	from	full	citizenship	rights	by	nurturing	an	alternative	status	derived	from	their	experiences	with	the	state	or	international	humanitarian	regime.		When	established	and	enduring	for	a	lengthy	period,	these	displacement-statuses,	we	show	here,	become	social	categories	and	identities	through	processes	of	abjection.	In	conclusion	we	show	how	citizenship	itself	becomes	ambiguous	through	norms	of	belonging,	the	formation	of	new	social	categories	and	because	forced	migrants	help	to	constitute	the	political.			
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Introduction	Civil	wars,	secessionist	movements,	and	irredentist	territorial	claims	have	often	produced	displaced	populations	who	receive	humanitarian	assistance,	but	are	nevertheless	also	citizens	of	the	affected	nations.	As	people	who	reside	somewhere	but	“belong	elsewhere”	they	effectively	hold	a	different	class	of	citizenship	and	may	even	be	excluded	from	mainstream	resources	despite	their	often	significant	importance	to	the	national	narrative	(Brun	2003;	2010).	.	This	article	argues	that	the	political	exclusion	of	
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displaced	people	living	within	states	under	a	variety	of	humanitarian	and	policy	categories	are	simultaneously	constitutive	of	mainstream	political	belonging	and	social	belonging	for	those	excluded.	Of	central	importance	to	our	argument	is	the	changing	nature	of	these	types	of	belonging	over	time	and,	by	extension,	the	way	citizenship	is	therefore	negotiated.	While	displaced,	citizens	may	live	for	decades	under	particular	humanitarian	categories	or	legal	statuses,	and	these	categories	in	turn	define	the	core	components	of	citizenship	(Stokke	this	issue).	For	these	displaced	citizens,	rights,	membership	and	participation	vis-a-vis	the	state	evolve,	giving	rise	to	tensions	with	mainstream	citizens	but	also	creating	social	identities	that	foster	belonging	forged	from	experiences	of	exclusion.	These	processes	of	‘abjection’--forms	of	state	control	and	boundary-making	that	exclude	members	from	the	very	thing	that	requires	their	inclusion--lead	to	a	type	of	ambiguous	citizenship	that	emerges	from	protracted	situations	of	displacement.			Based	on	long-term	research-engagement	with	and	the	analysis	of	three	situations	of	protracted	displacement	in	Georgia,	Jordan,	and	Sudan,	we	explore	how	citizenship	itself	becomes	ambiguous.	We	analyse	situations	where	an	initial	crisis-based	humanitarian	status	becomes	protracted,	and	in	which	people	are	labelled	forced	migrants	as	well	as	citizens.	We	show	that	these	various	statuses	contribute	to	excluding	people	from	citizenship	rights	through	a	process	of	‘abjection’	emerging	from	the	political	use	of	their	status	as	‘displaced’	creating	categorical	tension	with	state-sanctioned	citizenship	rights.	Simultaneously,	people	‘out	of	place’	in	a	state	may	exclude	themselves	from	full	citizenship	rights	by	nurturing	an	alternative	status	derived	from	their	experiences	with	the	state	or	international	humanitarian	regime.	When	established	and	enduring	for	a	lengthy	period,	these	displacement-statuses,	we	show	here,	become	social	categories	and	identities	through	processes	of	abjection.			To	understand	the	encounter	between	citizenship	and	displacement,	we	need	to	train	our	analytical	lens	beyond	and	below	the	nation-state	scale	to	understand	citizenship	as	lived	practices	where	norms	of	belonging	interact	with	legal	rights	to	profoundly	shape	access	to	membership,	participation	and	rights.	This	article	re-engages	the	Fàboss’	previous	discussions	of	long-term	displacement	and	challenges	to	ahistorical	thinking	(Brun	2003;	2015;	2016a;	Brun	&	Author	2015;	Fàbos	2015;	El	Abed	et	al.	2010;	El	Abed	2014;	2015),	and	Brun’s	ongoing	work	on	the	unintended	consequences	of	humanitarian	labels	in	protracted	situations	of	forced	migration	(Brun	2003;	2010).	The	‘displaced’	status	is	often	understood	as	a	humanitarian	category	that,	per	definition,	is	not	supposed	to	last.	Humanitarian	categories	are	based	on	an	emergency	imagery	(Calhoun	2004;	2010),	providing	people	who	are	understood	to	be	in	need	of	humanitarian	assistance	with	a	particular	temporality	that	lies	“out	of	the	ordinary”	(Brun	2016b).	However,	as	we	have	previously	demonstrated,	the	dilemmas	and	tensions	played	out	in	a	chronic	crisis	result	in	a	permanent	temporariness	in	the	lives	of	many	people	whose	status	and	identity	is	connected	to	an	initial	humanitarian	category	such	as	‘internally	displaced	person,’	‘stateless	person,’	or	‘refugee’	(Brun	&	Fàbos	2015;	El	Abed	2014).			
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The	conventional	understanding	of	citizenship	is	juxtaposed	with	opposing	notions	of	“non-citizen”--i.e.	immigrant,	foreigner,	refugee,	or	“other”.	However,	as	humanitarian	crises	persist	beyond	the	international	nation-state	resolution	framework,	these	categories	of	“displaced	citizens”	interact	with	conventional	norms	of	citizenship	and	the	rights	that	accrue	to	full-status	residents	of	the	states	(Brun;	Desforges	et	al.	2005;	Staeheli	et	al.	2012;	Nyers	2015).	The	age-old-	status	analysis	of	how	certain	social	groups	become	excluded	from	the	prevailing	rights	provided	to	citizens	gets	a	fresh	look	here	through	bringing	in	the	interplay	between	humanitarian	norms	and	labels,	and	citizenship	rights	through	the	formation	of	social	groups	and	the	dynamics	between	groups	and	the	state.	By	engaging	with	citizenship	as	inclusion	and	exclusion	by	way	of	processes	of	abjection,	we	seek	to	bring	new	light	into	the	relationship	between	categories	of	displacement	and	citizenship.		This	article	is	in	five	main	parts.	In	the	first	and	second	sections,	we	position	the	paper	in	the	discussion	of	the	application	of	Agamben’s	(1998)	‘bare	life’	and	the	alternative	and	more	productive	conceptualisation	of	‘abject	lives’	inspired	by	the	work	of	Judith	Butler	(1993)	and	Julia	Kristeva	(1982)	and	the	rich	body	of	literature	that	has	emerged	in	the	aftermath	of	their	writings.	In	the	third,	fourth	and	fifth	sections,	we	use	material	from	three	settings	where	initial	crisis-based	humanitarian	categories	have	transformed	into	social	categories	through	‘un-ending’	displacement,	and	where	policies	of	exclusion	and	separation	are	interwoven	with	narratives	of	citizenship	and	belonging.	In	each	of	the	settings,	subjects	initially	identified	with	a	humanitarian	category	are	or	have	been	recognized	as	citizens	of	the	nation-state	in	which	they	reside:	internally-displaced	persons	in	Georgia;	citizens	of	Palestinian	refugee	origin	in	Jordan,	and	former	internally-displaced	persons	in	Sudan	who	have	become	stateless	through	the	establishment	of	South	Sudan.	Through	these	case	studies,	we	test	the	idea	that	the	transformation	of	humanitarian	categories	into	social	categories	of	displacement	produces	abject	citizenship,	but	that	through	abject	living,	displaced	people	see	political	possibilities	for	using	their	status	for	creating	identity	and	belonging.	We	anticipate	that	our	analysis	can	contribute	to	the	discussion	on	the	changing	meaning	of	citizenship	in	situation	of	protracted	humanitarian	crises,	and	may	add	to	our	understanding	of	how	basic	rights	are	jeopardised	and	withheld	because	of	humanitarian	status.	
Categories	of	Displacement	in	Protracted	Crises:	From	Bare	Life	to	
Abject	Living	The	forced	migrant	is	often	understood	to	be	the	paradigmatic	victim	of	modern	life	(Lubkeman	2008).	States	use	various	categories	of	forced	migrants--refugees,	internally	displaced	persons,	stateless	people,	or	“others	of	concern”	(UNHCR)--to	define	national	and	local	belonging	and	to	nurture	particular	understandings	of	citizenship:	it	is	the	particular	tensions	between	norms	of	belonging	on	the	one	hand	and	norms	of	citizenship	on	the	other	that	we	are	interested	in	here.	Through	categories	of	displacement,	the	nation-state	legitimises	particular	processes	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	because	a	displaced	person	is	per	definition	a	person	who	belongs	somewhere	else,	has	been	uprooted	from	someplace	to	which	she	is	expected	to	return.	In	this	sense,	
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forced	migrants	are	often	understood	to	be	the	ultimate	biopolitical	subjects:	those	that	can	be	governed	at	the	level	of	exception	outside	the	normal	legal	framework.	Displacement	becomes	the	threat	to	the	“national	order	of	things”	(Malkki	1992)	posed	by	people	out	of	place	that	are	given	a	permanent	spatial	arrangement	through	institutional	and	extra-ordinary	spaces	for	forced	migrants,	such	as	camps.	By	placing	people	in	the	refugee	and	displacement-status	categories,	humanitarian	actors	and	the	state	in	effect	indicates	that	the	displaced	are	not	full	citizens,	that	they	cannot	access	all	the	rights	of	the	state,	and	that	they	do	not	belong.		This	understanding	originates	in	Agamben’s	(1998)	well-known	writing	about	the	camp,	in	which	he	argues	that	refugees	are	reduced	to	“bare	life”;	human	inas	much	as	their	biology	renders	them	living,	but	excluded	from	the	political	order	and	without	political	freedom.	However,	Agamben’s	way	of	thinking	about	the	reduction	of	human	capacity	to	“bare	life”	falls	short	in	a	number	of	ways.	Isin	&	Rygiel	(2007)	show	that	the	logic	of	the	camp,	as	set	out	by	Agamben,	does	not	or	cannot	account	for	the	novelty	of	the	kinds	of	spaces	that	have	been	created	as	a	result	of	displacement.	Additionally,	scholars	of	forced	migration	have	faulted	the	idea	of	bare	life	for	being	devoid	of	political	possibility	(see	for	example,	Owens	2009;	Lemke	2013;	Sigona	2015	),	since	there	is	no	opening	for	human	agency	in	bare	life.	We	assert,	furthermore,	that	living	in	conditions	of	bare	life	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	displaced	people	are	completely	outside	of	the	political	domain,	because	the	political	domain--the	state--is	notably	conditioned	on	the	role	of	those	who	are	defined	as	outside.		Consequently,,	we	need	to	find	an	understanding	that	reveals	its	simultaneous	inclusion	and	exclusion	in	the	political	order.			The	analysis	of	citizenship	is	indispensable	to	explaining	the	key	principles	of	membership	in	a	nation	state	and	the	established	power	between	the	regime	and	its	citizens	and	the	“right	for	them	to	have	rights”	(Brun;	Butenschon	2000;	Smith	2000;	Soysal	1994).		We	follow	in	our	work,	the	definition	from	1955	by	the	International	Court	of	Justice	where	citizenship	is	“a	legal	bond	having	as	its	basis	a	social	fact	of	attachment,	a	genuine	connection	of	existence,	interests	and	sentiments	together	with	the	existence	of	reciprocal	rights	and	duties”	to	indicate	that	rights	and	duties	as	well	as	identity	and	attachment	are	decisive	elements	of	citizenship	(cited	in	Batchelor	1995,	233,	see	also	Brun	2003).	A	common	distinction	to	understand	the	impact	of	citizenship	on	the	ground	is	the	separation	between	de	jure	and	de	facto	citizenship	(EU	2016;	Zetter	and	Long	2012).	We	analyse	the	experiences	of	displaced	populations	who	are	also	citizens	in	the	countries	in	which	they	reside	but	who	experience	a	tension	between	the	laws	(de	jure)	and	the	practiced	(de	facto)	citizenship	based	on	their	displacement.		We	thus	show	how	citizenship	may	be	applied	differently	based	on	residency,	belonging	and	formal	status	(Bauder	2013).	At	the	same	time,	however,	citizenship	is	experienced	and	practiced	in	everyday	lives	and	significantly	those	experiences	and	practices	may	seem	unrelated	to	the	legal	standards	(Staeheli	et	al	2012).	This	is	typically	taking	place	when	the	nation	state	fails	to	include	some	groups	in	the	full	sets	of	citizenship	rights,	as	we	return	to	below.	When	the	modern	state	fails	to	include	and	integrate	its	inhabitants	and	secure	them	their	rights	and	obligations,	while	monopolising	their	basic	resources,	we	need	to	find	an	alternative	conception	of	the	status	that	people	actually	experience.	
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This	article	presents	the	idea	of	‘abject	citizenship’	as	a	way	of	establishing	this	alternative,	whereby	politically	excluded	actors	are	still	included	in	the	juridical	order.	Unlike	bare	life,	abject	citizenship	additionally	opens	up	the	possibility	for	agency	and	creativity;	people	are	able	to	create	their	own	spaces,	meanings	and	identity	within	their	exclusion,	and	may	act	upon	new	political	possibilities.		In	the	next	section	we	deliberately	move	away	from	this	concept	of	‘bare	life”	and	unpack	some	of	the	ways	through	which	norms	of	belonging	and	citizenship	instead	intersect	through	abjection.	Abjection	lets	in	history	and	context,	and	demonstrates	that	both	reactive	and	proactive	moves	to	define	and	redefine	borders.	For	displaced	people	in	a	variety	of	citizenship	contexts,	abjection	recognizes	their	role	in	maintaining	mainstream	citizenship	rights	while	their	exclusion	hones	their	own	sense	of	belonging.				
Abjection:	Simultaneous	Exclusion	and	Inclusion	in	the	Political	Order	The	word	“abject”	comes	from	the	Latin	abjectus,	the	past	participle	of	the	Latin	verb	
abicere,	meaning	"to	cast	off"	(Merriam-Webster	2016|)	Its	original	meaning	in	English	was	"cast	off"	or	"rejected,"	but	it	is	now	used	more	broadly	to	refer	to	things	in	a	low	state	or	condition”	(Merriam-Webster	2016)	Abjection	as	a	concept	is	often	used	to	signal	exclusion	and	outsidership	as	well	as	political	misrecognition	(Sharkey	and	Shields	2008;	see	also	Nyers	2003).	Imogen	Tyler	(2013)	traces	the	concept	back	to	Georges	Bataille’s	writing,	where	“abjection	is	the	imperative	force	of	sovereignty,	a	founding	exclusion	which	constitutes	a	part	of	the	population	as	moral	outcasts”	(2013,	19).	Abjection	describes	the	ongoing	processes	of	bordering	that	make	and	unmake	both	the	psychological	and	material	boundaries	of	the	subject	(Tyler	2013).	From	this	follows	our	understanding	that	abjection	is	a	form	of	governmentality,	which	helps	to	explain	the	simultaneous	processes	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	of	displaced	populations.		Feminist	writers	Julia	Kristeva	(1982)	and	Judith	Butler	(1993)	have	been	main	sources	of	inspiration	in	contemporary	theorising	of	‘the	abject’.	For	Kristeva,	abject	describes	psychological	and	bodily	aversion--or	rejection.	At	a	more	general	level	she	describes	that	which	causes	abjection	as	“what	disturbs	identity,	system,	order.	What	does	not	respect	borders,	positions,	rules.	The	in-between,	the	ambiguous,	the	composite	(...)”	(Kristeva	1982,	4).	Scholars	like	Tyler	(2013)	and	Sharkey	and	Shields	(2008)	take	inspiration	from	the	different	scales	of	engagement	by	bringing	together	practices	of	subject	and	state	formation.	This	is	where	we	can	understand	abjection	as	a	meeting	point	between	norms	of	belonging,	mobility,	and	the	laws	of	citizenship	(Butler	1993).	It	is	a	way	of	understanding	how	individuals	and	groups	are	excluded,	but	at	the	same	time,	they	are	not	cut	off	from	that	which	excludes	them.	It	is	a	mutual	process	of	being	excluded	and	excluding	oneself,	of	becoming	part	of	the	norm	that	excludes	them.	In	other	words,	displacement	is	a	spatio-temporal	condition	with	the	label	‘out	of	place’	but	at	the	same	time	“never	fully	excluded”	(Sharkey	&	Shields	2008,	239).				We	consider	‘abjection’	to	be	a	more	productive	entry	point	for	understanding	current	
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processes	of	protracted	displacement	than	the	more	commonly	floated	but	problematic	‘bare	life’.	In	situations	where	the	displaced	‘victims’	are	also	citizens	of	the	state	in	which	they	reside,	‘abject	citizenship’	unveils	the	tension	between	citizenship	and	the	position	of	forced	migrants,	and	describes	how	forced	migrants	embody	this	tension.	Even	in	cases	where	experiences	of	state	exclusion	are	brutal	and	alienating,	we	demonstrate	here	that	the	presence	of	displaced	citizens	are	of	keen	interest	to	the	citizenship	regimes.	And,	the	practices	of	this	class	of	citizens	to	manage	their	predicament	maintain	a	discursive	challenge	to	binary	narratives	of	exclusion.			
Narratives	of	Abjection	in	Georgia,	Jordan	and	Sudan	Displaced	people	within	the	states	of	their	citizenship	experience	abject	living	through	tensions	between	group	membership	and	participation;	between	legal	status	and	access	to	rights.	Abjection	influences	people’s	experience	and	understanding	of	the	contested	right	to	be	present.	Here,	we	offer	three	examples	of	groups	of	forced	migrants--IDPs	in	Georgia,	Palestinians	with	Jordanian	citizenship,	and	now-stateless	South	Sudanese	displaced	earlier	as	IDPs	within	Sudan	a	result	of	civil	war--who	are	made	to	feel	like	outsiders,	and	their	right	to	membership	contested.	In	all	three	cases,	displacement	is	an	element	in	their	exclusion	from	full	membership	in	the	state	that	leads	to	their	participation	within	the	group	of	forced	migrants	rather	than	other	citizen	groups.	
Internally	Displaced	People	from	Abkhazia	in	Georgia	In	Georgia,	the	process	of	internal	displacement	for	ethnic	Georgians	from	Abkhazia	began	when	Georgia	was	declared	an	independent	nation-state	in	1991	after	the	dissolution	of	the	Soviet	Union.	This	was	rapidly	followed	by	the	secession	of	Abkhazia	from	Georgia	in	1992.	Georgian	authorities	refused	to	accept	the	secession	claims,	and	Georgian	forces	entered	Abkhazia	to	regain	the	disputed	territory.	As	a	result	of	fighting	and	the	defeat	of	the	Georgian	forces,	the	ethnic	Georgian	population,	approximately	46%	of	the	population	in	Abkhazia	at	the	time,	fled	their	homes	(ICRC	1999).	The	conflict	left	an	estimated	10,000	people	dead	and	some	250,000	displaced	(Amnesty	International	2010).	The	ethnic	Georgian	population	who	left	Abkhazia	for	Georgia	was	granted	the	status	of	internally	displaced	persons	(IDPs)	and	they,	and	their	descendants,	still	maintain	this	status.	An	IDP	is	a	person	who	has	fled	from	the	habitual	place	of	residence	but	not	crossed	an	internationally	recognised	nation	state	boundary.	Ethnic	Georgians	displaced	from	Abkhazia	are	both	Georgian	citizens	and	IDPs.			In	2016,	the	situation	may	be	described	as	a	frozen	conflict	with	periodic	outbursts	of	war.	Most	recently,	the	war	between	Russia	and	Georgia	in	August	2008	prompted	many	scholars	to	believe	that	Georgia	has	lost	de	facto	control	over	Abkhazia	(Kabachnik	2012).	Nevertheless,	the	nationalist	discourse	of	a	unified	Georgia	that	includes	Abkhazia	is	still	strong,	and	its	internally	displaced	people	play	an	important	role	in	keeping	alive	Georgia’s	hope	of	regaining	control	over	Abkhazia.	The	belief	that	return	represents	the	only	valid	solution	to	the	displacement	and	the	conflict	between	Georgia	and	Abkhazia	is	shared	by	most	IDPs.	Kabachnik	(2012)	explains	the	discourse	of	return	
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with	the	uncertainty	and	fear	surrounding	questions	related	to	Georgian	nationality	and	territorial	integrity	as	“Georgia’s	cartographic	anxiety.”	He	likens	the	gaining	of	independence	by	a	separatist	region	to	an	“‘amputation’,	leaving	‘wounds’	and	‘scars’”	(Kabachnik	2012,	47).	Accordingly,	the	return	of	the	IDPs	to	Abkhazia	is	a	concern	not	just	for	the	IDPs	themselves,	but	for	the	whole	Georgian	nation.	The	need	for	a	continued	inclusion	of	Abkhazia	in	Georgia	contributes	to	the	Abkhazians’	unending	IDP	status	and	has	consequences	for	understandings	of	belonging:	an	IDP	is	a	humanitarian	category	for	someone	residing	in	a	place	where	she	or	he	does	not	belong,	a	meaning	that	greatly	affects	people’s	status,	practices	and	identities.			As	unwilling	participants	in	Georgia’s	irredentist	drama,	Abkhazian	IDPs	have	struggled	to	recreate	a	sense	of	belonging	as	long-term	recipients	of	state	aid,	lack	of	access	to	mainstream	job	opportunities,	and	public	discourses	that	overlook	the	complexities	of	their	situation.	Nevertheless,	the	humanitarian	category	that	they	continue	to	inhabit	demonstrates	how	important	their	nostalgia	and	collective	memory	are	for	the	nation.	Their	abject	status--and	the	collective	identity	Abkhazian	IDPs	make	through	their	daily	practices--undergird	their	role	as	displaced	citizens,	and	point	to	the	tension	around	their	exclusion-as-inclusion.			
Palestinian-origin	Jordanians	as	Citizens	and	as	Refugees	Palestinian-origin	Jordanians	in	Jordan	share	certain	characteristics	as	Abkhaz-origin	ethnic	Georgians,	such	as	citizenship	rights	in	a	state	of	exile	and	a	marginalized	status	amongst	certain	classes	based	on	their	social	class,	power	and	social	networks.	As	per	the	Jericho	conference	in	December	1948,	which	laid	the	groundwork	for	the	annexation	of	what	was	left	of	historical	Palestinian	to	the	Hashemite	Kingdom	of	Jordan,	all	Palestinians	in	both	the	West	and	East	Banks	of	River	Jordan	were	granted	Jordanian	citizenship.	With	that,	Jordan	expanded	geographically	and	demographically.	The	population		of	the	kingdom,	initially	390,000	(Shaul	1978),	more	than	doubled	within	a	year,	and	soon	comprised		a	majority	of	Palestinians	expelled	from	their	homes	and	their	livelihoods	in	historical	Palestine.	More	than	80	percent	of	those	newcomer/citizens	were	farmers	and	peasants	(Smith	1971).	which	added	to	a	high	number	of	professional	urban	people	who	were	easily	integrated	into	the	newly	established	state	where	they	worked,	as	citizens,	in	the	administration	and	in	the	business	sector	in	the	newly	created	sectors.	The	international	community	with	United	Nations	for	Relief	and	Works	Agency	for	Palestine	Refugees	(UNRWA)	invested	in	the	economic	development	of	Jordan	in	order	to	integrate	the	big	number	of	refugees.	Large	scale	development	projects	were	created	in	the	East	Bank	of	Jordan	and	the	cities	grew	with	the	trained	human	capital	into	urbanised	spaces.Jordan	also	took	charge	of	the	administration	and	services	for	those	living	in	the	West	Bank,	and	had	the	guardianship	(which	continues	until	today)	over	al-Quds	(Jerusalem)	with	its	Dome	of	the	Rock	mosque.					Refugee	camps	were	created	and	UNRWA	took	charge	of	the	social	services	for	Palestine	refugees	in	Jordan	and	in	the	other	territories	where	Palestinians	fled	(Lebanon,	Syria,	the	West	Bank	and	Gaza	Strip)	providing	basic	education,	vocational	education,	health	clinics	and	relief	for	hardship	cases.	A	majority	of	the	trained	Palestinian-origin	
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Jordanians	sought	work	opportunities	in	the	Gulf,	taking	advantage	of	the	Oil	boom.	The	flow	of	aid	and	remittances	from	the	Gulf	countries	to	Jordan	had	a	major	impact	on	the	economic	development	of	Jordan	until	the	late	1980s.			The	1967	war,	in	which	Israel	militarily	occupied	the	West	Bank	of	Jordan,	displaced	a	new	group	of	350,000	refugees	to	the	East	Bank	(Abu	Odeh	1999).	More	refugees	arrived	from	the	Gaza	Strip	which	was	under	the	Military	and	administrative	rule.	Jordan	hosted	them	in	the	growing	cities	and	in	refugee	camps.	With	the	assistance	of	UNRWA,	services	were	provided,	as	before.	The	majority	of	this	new	influx	already	held	Jordanian	citizenship,	except	for	those	who	arrived	from	Gaza,	who	have	been	given	a	temporary	status.	The	1970s	tension	between	Palestinian	guerrillas	and	some	Jordanian	military	forces	sculpted	Jordanian	national	identity	while	defining	some	Palestinians	as	“other”.	These	processes	of	othering	were	strengthened	after	1974	conference	in	Rabat	when	the	King	of	Jordan	was	pressured	to	recognize	the	Palestinian	Liberation	Organisation	(PLO)	as	the	sole	and	legitimate	representative	of	the	Palestinian	people,	even	while	his	country	hosted	about	fifty	percent	of	the	Palestinian	refugees	(Abu	Odeh	1999).	In	response,	Jordan	sought	to	‘Jordanise’	its	institutions,	creating	subtle	barriers	for	Palestinian-Jordanian	citizens	in	employment	and	higher	education.	While	on	paper,	university	education	and	job	opportunities	are	open	to	all	citizens	equally,	the	“subtle”ipolicies	of	the	state	towards	citizens	from	different	origins,	economic	class	and	status	(power)	have,	de	facto,	aimed	at	de-Palestinising	the	public	sector	by	significantly	reducing	their	“visibility”(Abu	Odeh	1999).			For	Palestinian	citizens	of	Jordan,	abject	status	emerged	over	time	as	political	boundaries	hardened.	State	policies	to	enhance	opportunities	for	economically	disadvantaged	Jordanians--code	for	“loyal”	citizens	from	tribal	or	local	land-holding	families	rather	than	those	of	Palestinian	refugee	background--were	built	upon	continued	national	and	regional	support	for	an	eventual	independent	Palestinian	state.	And,	despite	their	citizenship	status,	Palestinian	Jordanians	keep	the	Right	of	Return	project	very	much	alive.	Through	abject	living,	these	refugee-citizens	maintain	a	collective	identity	that	does	not	require	the	conditions	of	bare	life;	their	status	stems	from	mutual	interest	with	the	Jordanian	state--the	eventual	return	of	Palestinian	refugees	to	Palestine.				
South	Sudanese	Doubly	Displaced	in	Sudan		In	situations	where	the	displaced	‘victims’	are	citizens	of	the	state	in	which	they	reside	(such	as	internally	displaced	persons	in	Georgia	and	Palestinian	refugees	in	Jordan),	the	term	‘bare	life’	represents	a	political	impossibility.	The	Republic	of	Sudan	gained	independence	in	1956	after	a	half-century	of	British	colonial	administration.	The	new	country’s	borders	incorporated	a	dizzying	mix	of	linguistic,	religious,	and	tribal	groups	but	with	some	clear	political	hierarchies	in	relation	to	the	dominant	Arabic-speaking	Muslim	ruling	class.	Some	of	these	members	were	descended	from	powerful	tribal	groups	who	had	historically	participated	in	slave-raiding	and	slave-trading	from	populations	and	tribal	groups	living	in	the	areas	designated	as	“the	South”.	The	economic	and	political	interests	of	the	northern	rulers	in	the	south,	combined	with	their	
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religious	bigotry	and	racism,	created	conditions	for	a	marginalized	underclass	of	Sudanese	citizens.	Southern	rebel	movements	emerged	to	challenge	the	unequal	political	and	economic	national	structures	from	1955	to	1973,	and	again	between	1983	and	2005,	producing	significant	southern	Sudanese	refugee	flows,	as	well	as	internal	displacement	in	the	south	as	well	as	to	the	northern	provinces.	In	particular,	Khartoum,	Sudan’s	capital,	ballooned	from	a	few	hundred	thousand	residents	in	the	early	1980s	to	a	sprawling	city	that	included	several	million	internally	displaced	persons	from	the	multiple	humanitarian	disasters	facing	Sudan’s	populations	(Shadid	2000).	While	southern	Sudanese	had	full	Sudanese	citizenship,	their	marginalization	by	the	dominant	class	of	Arabic-speaking,	Muslim	Sudanese	had	been	built	into	the	national	framework	of	the	country,	even	during	democratic	periods.	In	2005,	a	comprehensive	peace	process	between	the	Government	of	Sudan	and	the	longstanding	rebel	group,	the	Sudan	People’s	Liberation	Movement	(SPLM)	agreed	to	a	referendum	to	decide	upon	South	Sudanese	self-determination.	Overwhelmingly,	southern	Sudanese	voted	to	secede,	and	in	2011	South	Sudan	became	an	independent	nation.			While	many	refugees	and	displaced	persons	returned	to	their	areas	of	origin	in	South	Sudan,	many--including	those	who	had	lived	in	northern	Sudan--expressed	concern	that	the	new	country	lacked	infrastructure	and	jobs.	Recent	estimates	suggest	that	between	500,000	-	700,000	South	Sudanese	still	live	among	the	3.2	million	IDPs	in	Sudan	(UNHCR	2016),	with	approximately	250,000	residing		in	the	capital	city,	Khartoum	and	its	environs	(UNHCR	2014).	Their	subsequent	disenfranchisement	when	the	south	of	the	country	seceded	to	become	South	Sudan	is	a	case	of	multiple	displacements	and	unending	exile.	The	“displacement	in	place”	thrust	upon	South	Sudanese	by	the	state	and	the	humanitarian	agencies	whose	aid	replaced	social	services	depends	upon	a	history	of	state-sponsored	racism,	suspicions	related	to	civil	war	combatants,	and	a	government	discourse	of	jihad	against	southern	“infidels.”			As	former	citizens	of	Sudan,	displaced	persons,	and	recipients	of	humanitarian	relief,	disenfranchised	South	Sudanese	are	still	present	as	meaningful	participants	in	the	political	and	national	order	of	the	new	nation	states	of	Sudan	and	South	Sudan.	Regardless	of	whether	or	not	they	have	been	stripped	of	their	citizenship,	doubly-displaced	South	Sudanese	experience	abject	citizenship	through	being	subjected	to	political	bargaining	between	the	two	states.	But	their	status	reveals	a	form	of	agency	that	belies	the	exclusion	and	marginalisation	of	having	been	stripped	of	their	Sudanese	citizenship.	These	former	IDPs	have	a	terrible	choice	to	make--remain	stateless	in	Sudan	or	relocate	to	an	unstable	country	in	which	they	have	citizenship	rights	but	lack	livelihoods,	security,	and	personal	knowledge	of	the	post-war	situation.	Under	these	circumstances,	their	continued	presence	in	Sudan	defies	the	bi-national	narrative	of	secession	and	the	unmixing	of	peoples	between	Sudan	and	South	Sudan.	While	there	are	a	variety	of	reasons	for	stateless	South	Sudanese	to	reject	their	ouster	by	Sudan--many	were	born	in	Sudan,	speak	Arabic	and	have	no	family	ties	in	South	Sudan,	while	others	have	developed	livelihoods	and	social	networks	in	their	place	of	displacement--the	inherent	politics	of	their	identity	has	drawn	them	together	as	a	displaced	social	group.		
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Becoming	Social	Categories:	Citizenship	as	Inclusion	and	Exclusion	Recent	work	on	citizenship	has	placed	citizenship’s	universalistic	claims	under	scrutiny	from	the	perspectives	of	a	range	of	marginalized	social	groups	and	of	nation-state	“outsiders”	(Kabeer	2005;	Lister	2007).	Citizenship	is	always	about	simultaneous	processes	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	(Brun	2003).	It	is	worth	examining	the	problematic	universalist	promise	of	citizenship	and	unpacking	the	exclusionary	forces	of	citizenship	from	within,	whether	political,	ethnic,	social,	or	other.	The	exclusionary	forces	of	citizenship	among	citizens	indicate	a	move	towards	a	citizenship	understood	in	the	context	of	“an	ethos	of	pluralisation	[which]	makes	possible	a	radically	plural	rather	than	dual	way	of	thinking	about	citizenship	and	identity”	(Isin	&	Wood	1999,	23;	see	also	Young	1990;	2009;	Lister	2007).	It	is	in	this	context	of	an	ethos	of	pluralisation	that	the	relevance	of	social	groups	become	apparent	for	citizenship.	A	social	group	is	defined	by	a	set	of	shared	attributes	and	by	a	sense	of	identity	(Young	1990;	2009).	Young	shows	how	social	groups	are	“not	entities	that	exist	apart	from	individuals	but	neither	are	they	merely	arbitrary	classifications	of	individuals	according	to	attributes	that	are	external	to	or	accidental	to	their	identities”	(Young	2009,	8-9).	She	emphasises	that	group	meanings	partially	constitute	people’s	identities	in	terms	of	cultural	forms,	social	situations,	and	histories	that	group	members	know	as	theirs	because	these	meanings	have	been	either	forced	on	them	or	forged	by	them	or	both.			Social	groups	may	be	defined	according	to	specific	dimensions	such	as	solidarity	and	fellowship;	struggling/mobilising	for	material	and	ideal	interests;	classification	struggles	and	labelling;	and,	institutionalisation	(Isin	&	Wood	1999).	The	formation	of	social	groups	takes	place	in	a	dynamic	between	internal	and	external	forces;	as	an	interplay	between	the	state,	the	majority	(general	population)	and	people	identifying	with	a	particular	group.	Such	group	formation	can	potentially	enable	oppression	through	the	dynamics	of	power	and	differential	access	to	resources	--	symbolic,	political,	economic.	However,	at	the	same	time,	social	justice	requires	institutions	that	promote	reproduction	of	and	respect	for	group	differences	without	oppression	which	again	requires	special	rights	attending	to	group	differences.	Within	a	pluralist	notion	of	citizenship,	rights,	resources,	political	recognition,	access	to	participation	and	membership	can	result	from	mobilisation	via	a	social	group	because	social	groups	may	form	a	political	possibility.			Forming	social	groups	is		”	(…)	[always]	fraught	with	danger	that,	instead	of	advancing	the	legitimate	claims	of	its	members,	it	may	turn	an	oppressive	power	on	them”	…	(Isin	&	Wood	1999,	38).	In	the	three	cases	of	displaced	citizens	in	national	contexts	presented	here,	categories	of	displacement	become	social	categories	that	have	an	effect	on	membership,	participation	and	rights	as	citizens	in	their	countries	of	residence.	In	particular	cases	of	long	term	displacement,	categories	that	in	some	ways	were	linked	to	humanitarian	needs	over	time	have	changed	their	meaning	to	become	accidental	communities	of	memory:	people	who	have	experienced	war	together	and	who	live	together	as	displaced	persons,	but	who	might	not	otherwise	have	met	in	the	ordinary	course	of	their	lives.	The	displaced	communities	that	become	social	groups	are	based	on	
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solidarity	and	fellowship	(a	common	history	of	forced	migration	and	a	lost	home),	material	and	ideal	interests	(assistance	and	the	right	to	return),	labelling	and	a	common	identity;	and	institutionalisation	(interest	groups,	specific	rules	and	regulations,	customary	law).			In	Georgia,	where	most	IDPs	settled	and	continue	to	live	in	Western	Georgia	and	in	and	around	the	capital	Tbilisi,	IDPs	are	still	-	after	more	than	20	years	of	displacement	considered	as	Other,	as	a	different	group	from	the	Georgians	non-displaced	residents.	But	also	for	the	IDPs	themselves,	it	is	important	to	maintain	the	IDP-category.	As	an	example,	Tamunaii,	a	woman	in	her	twenties	and	an	activist	working	in	a	civil	society	organisation,	fled	Abkhazia	as	a	child.	For	her	it	is	extremely	important	to	maintain	the	IDP	category;	it	is	part	of	her	identity.	She	says	the	reasons	to	maintain	the	IDP	category	are	political.	It	has	to	do	with	her	displacement	history,	her	rights	and	her	status	in	the	Georgian	society.	The	IDP	category	helps	to	explain	why	she	belongs	to	a	marginalised	social	group,	why	she	cannot	afford	having	a	place	of	her	own	but	shares	a	room	with	her	aunt	in	a	privatised	space	in	a	collective	centreiii.	She	grew	up	understanding	she	did	not	belong.	Recounting	how	non-displaced	children	in	her	school	were	told	by	her	teachers	that	the	collective	centres	were	dangerous	places	and	no-go	places	for	her	peers,	she	felt	as	if	her	home	was	defined	as	a	dangerous	space	and	her	people	threatening	and	different.	This,	and	many	similar	events,	made	her	feel	excluded	from	the	general	society	and	the	IDP	category	was	to	some	extent	a	comfort	-	and	a	social	group	she	felt	she	belonged	to.			In	Jordan,	the	categorisation	of	citizens	into	classes,	statuses	and	origins	empowered	some	groups	to	access	better	educational	or	employment	opportunities	and	strengthened	others	in	their	social	and	political	status,	excluding,	as	a	result	several	other	groups.	Over	the	years	and	due	to	several	political	and	economic	events,	categorisation	of	citizens	has	tended	to	obliterate	the	rights	of	disenfranchised	Palestinian-Jordanian	refugee-citizens	coming	from	lower-middle	classes,	while	privileging	those	who	are	best	serving	the	interest	of	the	state,	supporting	its	ideology	and	claiming	allegiance.	With	the	Palestinian-origin	Jordanian	population	surpassing	that	of	the	East	Jordanians,	the	priority	of	the	state	since	the	1970s	events	where	clashes	happened	between	some	Palestinian	guerrilla	and	some	Jordanian	army	members,	has	been	given	to	the	East	Jordanians	in	employment,	education	and	other	rights.	Collective	identity	continue	to	be	based	on	the	claim	of	safeguarding	right	of	return	which	is	often	presented,	as	if	ensuring	fully	fledged	rights	could	erase	the	national	identity	or	roots	of	the	individuals.	Refugee	camps	and	refugee	status	have	become	the	symbols	of	return	representing	the	political	stance	of	the	host	state.	The	liberalisation	politics	since	1989	have	created	a	monopoly	empowering	those	involved	in	politics	and	business,	close	to	the	regime.	This	widened	the	disparity	amongst	people,	creating	several	socioeconomic	classes.	The	groups	varied	from	those	fully-fledged	citizens	holding	Jordanian	national	numbers	to	the	others	who	have	become	West	Bankers	since	the	severance	of	the	West	and	East	Banks	in	1988	and	the	holders	of	provisional	Jordanian	travel	documents,	the	Gaza	refugees	since	1967.	Rights	varied	and	claims	for	equal	rights	amongst	everyone	were	encountered	by	political	challenges	affecting	their	dual	identity	and	their	class	and	
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status.	Despite	having	acquired	citizenship	rights,	these	Palestinian	refugees/Jordanian	citizens	of	East	Amman	have	not	received	the	same	rights	and	privileges	as	other	Jordanian	citizens.	The	politics	of	domination	and	stratification	has	been	perpetuated	by	regulating	access	to	social	citizenship	rights	–	particularly	access	to	higher	education	and	economic	opportunities.	The	citizenship	has	‘invisibilised’	their	basic	rights	and	their	integration.	Palestinian	origin	Jordanians	chose	alienation	and	invisibilisation	in	order	to	be	included	in	a	state	that	has	not	managed	to	include	everyone	on	its	territories.	Discursive	politics	has	managed,	in	this	way,	to	create	politically,	economically	and	socially	privileged	citizens,	which	in	turn	means	that	other	segments	of	the	population,	citizens	and	non-citizens,	access	fewer	de	facto	rights	and	have	less	power.		In	Sudan,	despite	their	prior	citizenship	in	the	Sudanese	state,	displaced	southern	Sudanese	were	largely	excluded	from	state-run	social	services,	with	provision	of	water,	medical	care,	and	education	provided	by	UNHCR	and	its	implementing	partners.	Muslim	Sudanese	domination	of	the	national	framework	of	Sudan,	which	significantly	draws	upon	a	history	of	slave-raiding	and	slave-trading	conducted	by	“Arabs,”	shapes	the	circumstances	of	their	permanent	temporariness	and	abject	status.	Indeed,	representatives	of	the	majority	population	in	Sudan,	Arabic-speaking	Muslim-identified	Sudanese	have	for	decades	referred	to	their	southern	compatriots	as	abiid--the	Arabic	word	for	“slave.”	This	anachronistic	pejorative	is	also	rendered	spatially,	whereby	Sudanese	citizens	with	roots	in	the	south	have	long	been	viewed	as	having	no	political	belonging.	For	example,	a	1996	conversation	with	Arabic-speaking	Muslim	Sudanese	businessmen	who	were	visiting	their	compatriots	in	Egypt	loudly	complained	about	the	number	of	“foreigners”	back	home	in	Khartoum.	Upon	further	clarification,	the	men	expressed	their	distaste	for	the	many	thousands	of	displaced	southern	Sudanese	citizens	residing	in	Khartoum--people,	I	pointed	out,	who	had	every	right	to	live	in	the	capital	city	of	their	country,	but	who	were	existing	instead	in	abject	social,	economic,	and	political	conditions	(Fàbos	2010).			The	new	political	border	between	Sudan	and	South	Sudan	has	dramatically	altered	the	humanitarian	categories	and	political	identities	used	to	describe	South	Sudanese	in	Sudan.	Before	2011,	they	were	displaced	citizens--albeit	racialised	and	second	class	citizens--but	since	secession	they	have	in	addition	been	stripped	of	their	Sudanese	citizenship	and	asked	to	“return”	to	a	home	country	that	many	of	them	do	not	know.	Regularizing	their	political	status	has	required	many	of	these	newly-claimed	citizens	of	South	Sudanese	to	document	their	origins	in	the	“indigenous	tribes”	residing	in	the	independent	territory	(Manby	2012)	and	apply	for	visas	as	foreigners.	But	Schultz	(2014)	also	identifies	the	very	category	‘displaced’	used	by	humanitarian	organizations	to	refer	to	South	Sudanese	living	in	the	north	as	problematic;	she	argues	that,		by	referring	to	people	as	displaced	persons,	a	reality	is	constructed	in	which	people	are	not	only	denied	citizenship	rights	but	also	rejected	from	feeling	at	home	in	the	place	they	stay.	This	happened	to	all	Southern	Sudanese	after	the	CPA	when	they	were	construed	as	‘displaced’	people	by	international	organisations,	such	as	the	UNHCR	and	the	IOM	and	the	GoS.	(Schultz	2014,	306)	
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In	this	sense,	South	Sudanese	in	Sudan	have	been	given	an	unwelcome	humanitarian	category,	that	of	‘displaced’	and	‘going	home’,	that	does	not	match	with	their	own	social	understanding	and	lived	experience.			In	all	three	cases	we	analyze	here,	the	abject	status	comes	to	light	as	a	result	of	the	formation	of	new	social	groups	originating	in	a	common	identity	of	being	forced	migrants.	This	particular	identity	and	social	status	within	the	nation	state	enable	exclusion,	invisibilisation	and	disenfranchisment	by	the	state	based	on	the	categorisation	of	displacement	as	social	group.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	cases	analysed	show	that	there	is	a	simultaneous	self-exclusion,	self-alienation	and	inward	orientation	towards	the	same	displaced	group	because	those	excluded	also	accept	the	norms	of	the	exclusion.			
Spatio-temporal	Tensions,	from	Bare	Life	to	Abject	Citizenship	Processes	of	abjection	contribute	to	the	formation	of	social	groups.	The	abject	becomes	a	kind	of	counter-space	and	identity	is	formed	as	an	outcome	of	abjection.	Processes	of	abjection	make	group	formation	possible;	displacement,	in	our	analysis,	becomes	the	basis	on	which	social	groups	are	formed.	When	displacement	is	long	term,	often	experienced	as	‘un-ending’,	displaced	communities	become	social	groups	that	are	considered	marginal,	almost	on	the	outside	of	-	and	excluded	from	-	society	based	on	norms	of	belonging	and	the	politics	of	citizenship	and	territoriality.	Abjection	refers	to	processed	of	being	excluded	but	also	making	oneself	excluded.			Through	abjection,	subject	formation	and	state	formation	interact	and	represent	‘the	making	together’	(Tyler	2013)	of	citizenship	in	the	context	of	displacement.	We	can	identify	the	creation	of	a	particular	‘lived	citizenship’	through	people’s	practice	and	identities	(Christensen	&	Siim	2010;	Lister	2007).	People	work	within	their	exclusion	to	create	their	own	identity	(Sharkey	&	Shields	2008).	And	as	we	show	below,	it	is	the	particular	nurturing	of	the	identity	and	status	of	the	displaced,	and	the	accompanying	norms	of	“out	of	place”,	NOT-BELONGING	that,	to	a	large	extent	enables	these	processes	of	abjection.	Sharkey	and	Shields	explain	that,		For	them,	a	form	of	contradictory,	abject	citizenship	becomes	possible	–	one	where	they	are	considered	outsiders	to	the	establishment,	refuse,	trash;	one	where	this	reduced	status	is	the	norm,	and	it	is	the	established	insiders	who	becomes	the	outsiders.	Hypothetically,	this	stabilizes	identities	for	the	abject	who	maintain	a	marginal	presence	in	public	space	despite	being	excluded.	The	label	of	‘abject’	is	not	pure	but	a	real	work/reworking	of	second-class	status	and	exclusion	which	violates	the	black-	white	view	held	by	established	insiders.	Abject	citizenship	becomes	their	flag	of	convenience”.	(Sharkey	&	Shields	2008,	247)	 	 	 	 	Displacement	represents	a	change	in	the	political	geography	of	citizenship.	Categories	of	displacement	are	highly	politicised	categories,	hence	subjects	identified	with	those	categories	are	also	seen	as	part	of	the	political	that	constitutes	citizenship.	When	displacement	categories	become	protracted	and	turn	into	social	categories,	the	political	
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nature	of	the	categories	create	particular	exclusions	that	lead	to	abject	living	and	abject	citizenship.	Citizens	who	are	displaced	persons	(IDPs),	refugees	or	who	become	stateless	nevertheless	help	to	constitute	the	political	order.	Social	abjection	is	a	theoretical	resource	that	enables	us	to	consider	the	states	of	exclusion	that	takes	place	on	the	margins	(Tyler	2013).			At	a	more	general	level	in	the	Georgian	case,	we	can	understand	the	experience	of	displacement	and	its	consequences	in	the	light	of	abjection;	there	was	a	mutual,	negotiated	process	of	rejection,	exclusion	and	separation	that	took	place.	The	IDPs	wanted	to	stay	together	to	support	each	other	and	to	maintain	their	rights	as	IDPs	which	came	with	assistance	and	a	continued	state	commitment	to	the	right	to	return.	Tamuna’s	reaction,	must	be	understood	in	light	of	the	larger	discourses	on	internal	displacement	in	Georgia	where	there	is	an	interest	by	both	the	state,	the	non-displaced	population	and	by	the	displaced	to	maintain	the	category,	but	for	different	reasons.	The	day	the	government	gives	up	the	IDP	category,	those	displaced	give	up	the	hope	for	return,	since		giving	up	the	hope	for	return	also	means	giving	up	the	territories	of	Abkhazia	from	where	Tamuna	were	displaced.	Maintaining	the	IDP	category,	even	though	it	is	a	fluid	and	constantly	negotiated	status,	remains	important	for	the	Georgian	national	identity.	For	the	IDPs	themselves,	maintaining	the	IDP	category	involves	right	to	return	and	compensation,	access	to	protection,	and	the	safety	and	recognition	from	within	a	social	group	rather	than	from	the	Georgian	society.		Jordan’s	discursive	politics	around	Palestinian-origin	citizens,	with	the	various	labels	and	constantly	changing	legal/political	categories	given	to	their	status,	have	rendered	their	integration	one	of	uncertainty	and	fear.	Amidst	the	invisibilisation	politics	led	by	the	state,	Palestinians	of	Jordan,	be	situated	within	civic	‘black	holes’	wherein	the	unwanted	are	sequestered	as	utterly	available	victims	(Butenshon	2000,	626).	Palestinian-origin	Jordanians	face	“a	technology	of	‘care	and	control’…a	technology	of	power	entailing	the	management	of	space	and	movement-	for	‘peoples	out	of	place’”	(Malkki	1992,	34).	The	state	with	its	practiced	apparatus	of	power	of	exclusion	and	population	management	politics	has	excluded	people	from	the	wider	societal	circles	in	which	they	are	included;	despite	their	Jordanian	citizenship,	their	refugee	status	and	their	Palestinian	identity	have	resulted	in	them	being	denied	their	rights	by	the	Jordanian	state.	Importantly,	the	political	economy	of	the	state	has,	over	many	decades,	rules	using	politics	of	divisiveness,	as	a	way	to	manage	its	hybrid	population,	labeling	citizens	as	refugees	or	Palestinians	and	empowering	those	showing	political	allegiance	and	those	sharing	economic	interests	and	sharpening	the	means	of	expressing	Jordanian	national	identity.	It	has	enabled	the	state	to	distribute	its	resources	in	ways	that	benefit	its	own	interests	in	its	economic	development	projects	and	in	funding	its	budget.	Palestinian	origin	Jordanians	representing	different	classes	and	statuses	have	been	affected	directly	or	indirectly	by	such	politics	as	if	being	reminded	of	their	displacement	from	Historical	Palestine.	Many	Palestinians	defy	this	politics	by	sticking	more	loudly	to	the	Palestinian	identity	and	to	their	right	of	return,	flagging	by	this	their	displacement,	that	has	exceeded	today	five	generations.			
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While	many	displaced	southern	Sudanese	returned	to	independent	South	Sudan	in	organized	repatriations	in	2010	and	2011,	thousands	stayed	behind	to	live	as	“foreigners”	in	their	former	country	of	citizenship.	Many	younger	South	Sudanese	born	in	the	north	had	never	even	visited	their	purported	homeland.	A	2012	cooperation	agreement	between	Sudan	and	South	Sudan	promising,	among	other	things,	mutual	residency	permission,	has	never	been	implemented.	The	uncertainty	and	invisibility	in	which	South	Sudanese	live	is	captured	by	Grabska	&	Miller	(2016),	who	describe	the	housing	strategies	that	marginalized	South	Sudanese	pursue	in	a	wealthy	neighborhood	in	Khartoum.	One	such	place,	an	old	villa	in	a	key	location	and	still	owned	by	the	South	Sudanese	government,	has	become	a	residence	for	a	diverse	group	of	South	Sudanese	university	students,	older	men,	families,	and	single	mothers,	mainly	from	the	Dinka	tribe.	Grabska	and	Miller	describe	not	only	the	struggles	for	livelihoods,	education,	and	inclusion	in	the	newly	reconfigured	Sudan,	but	also	the	solidarity	that	emerges	from	their	shared	experience.	In	interviews	with	the	house’s	residents,	they	identify	a	sense	of	being	“stuck”	in	Khartoum,	but	also	being	privileged	at	not	living	in	a	war	zone.			Other	men	commented	that	now	it	is	different	in	the	sense	that	they	feel	that	they	are	South	Sudanese.	“Jenubeeniv”,	Ayen	says	proudly,	“I	am	Jenubeen”.	And	then	she	laughs.	The	sharing	of	a	space	with	other	South	Sudanese	in	the	house	allows	her	and	the	others	to	reinforce	their	sense	of	being	Jenubeen	in	the	struggle	with	difficulties	vis	à	vis	the	Sudanese	state.	(Grabska	&	Miller	2016,	14)	The	authors	nevertheless	demonstrate	the	underlying	tensions	in	the	“we	are	one”	discourse,	and	describe	the	house	as	a	metaphor	for	the	transformation	of	South	Sudanese	identity.	For	these	abject	citizens,	their	unified	membership	in	a	doubly	displaced	social	group	is	necessary	not	only	for	the	Sudanese	government	which	has	labeled	these	former	citizens	“foreign”,	but	also	for	the	South	Sudanese	state	for	whom	their	continued	presence	as	non-citizens	in	the	north	establishes	its	legitimacy.		As	mentioned	above,	abjection	is	an	ongoing	process	of	bordering	(Kristeva	1982).	The	particular	construction	of	a	norm	of	belonging	that	takes	place	through	the	dynamic	between	displacement	and	citizenship	constructs	the	victim,	a	figure	out	of	the	ordinary,	that	do	not	belong/is	out	of	place,	but	at	the	same	time	essential	for	constituting	citizenship.	Abject	citizenship,	in	itself	a	contradiction	in	terms,	is	in	this	context	experienced	through	tensions	between	legal	status	and	rights;	membership	and	participation	(Stokke,	introduction	to	this	special	issue).	We	have	explored	some	of	the	mechanisms	that	prevent	people	associated	with	displacement	and	humanitarian	categories	from	accessing	rights	by	analysing	the	‘symbiotic’	relationship	between	the	interests	of	the	state	and	the	interests	of	people	associated	with	categories	of	displacement:	they	(the	forced	migrants	and	the	state)	both	want	to	maintain	the	categories,	but	for	different	reasons.	This	symbiosis	enables	the	controlling	of	particular	territories	by	the	state,	rights	to	particular	places,	recognition	of	the	various	injustices	that	people	in	the	displacement	category	has	experienced	but	at	the	same	time	the	justification	of	continuous	injustices.		
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Conclusions:	Abject	Citizenship	and	the	Right	to	be	Present	‘Abjection’	helps	to	conceptualise	how	people	displaced	in	the	different	contexts	of	Georgia,	Jordan	and	Sudan	are	included	in	the	juridical	order,	but	at	the	same	time	excluded	in	different	permutations--	all	as	a	result	of	a	history	of	displacement.	In	all	three	cases,	there	is	a	tension	between	legal	status	and	rights.	IDPs	in	Georgia	are	citizens	of	their	own	countries,	but	the	IDP	status	excludes	them	(and	they	exclude	themselves)	from	full	citizenship	rights.	In	the	case	of	Jordanian	Palestinians,	they	are	citizens,	but	the	history	of	displacement	and	the	strong	Palestinian	political	identity	has	led	to	systematic	exclusion	and	deprivation	of	rights.	In	the	case	of	Sudan,	the	South	Sudanese	who	were	displaced	as	citizens	(IDPs)	then	lost	their	access	to	citizenship	upon	South	Sudan’s	2011	independence	by	refusing	to	leave	their	homes	in	the	north	to	“return	home”.		Processes	of	abjection	take	place	in	the	tension	between	norms	of	belonging	on	the	one	hand,	and	laws	of	citizenship	on	the	other.	The	lived	experiences	of	long	term	displacement	together	with	the	politics	of	the	state	and	the	norms	of	the	general	society	contribute	to	the	formation	of	social	groups	based	on	the	categories	of	displacement.	As	we	have	shown	through	the	brief	analysis	of	three	cases	of	long	term	displacement,	the	formation	of	social	groups,	although	helpful	in	mobilising	certain	resources	through	a	common	identity,	also	enables	oppression,	rendering	a	group	invisible	and	preventing	access	to	essential	citizenship	rights.			The	insights	we	contribute	in	this	paper	are	not	entirely	new.	Citizenship	is	always	about	processes	of	inclusion	and	exclusion.	We	have	demonstrated	that	there	are	unintended	consequences	of	long	term	association	with	the	category	of	displacement	and	the	role	of	these	identities	for	access	to	citizenship	rights.	In	the	case	of	forced	migration,	when	a	nation-state	border	has	not	been	crossed,	or	people	are	“given”	citizenship	but	continue	to	live	with	a	displacement	status,	a	liminal	status	of	“out	of	place”	is	enforced	through	norms	and	politics.	Citizenship	can	be	used	as	a	political	possibility	to	enable	resistance	and	struggle	for	inclusion.	In	a	similar	vein,	the	category	of	displacement	is	not	devoid	of	agency.	The	spatiality	of	categories	of	displacement	may	indicate	alternative	ways	of	practicing	citizenship	-	away	from	the	Western	construct	in	democratic	states	-	towards	a	more	differential	notion	and	norm	of	citizenship	in	Georgia,	Jordan	and	Sudan	-	all	relatively	new	nation	states	with	different	regimes	of	mobility	and	belonging	in	which	the	state	takes	on	particular	powers	in	governing	the	different	forms	of	mobility	associated	with	the	territory	under	their	control.					The	institutionalisation	of	preventing	access	to	citizenship	rights	vary	in	the	three	cases,	with	the	IDPs	in	Sudan	as	the	most	extreme,	where	the	displacement	status	helps	to	justify	statelessness.	In	all	three	cases,	abjection,	understood	as	governance	through	norms	of	aversion,	helps	to	explain	what	processes	take	place	between	categories	of	displacement	and	citizenship.	The	temporality	of	displacement	categories	justifies	the	exclusion	from	citizenship	rights	because	the	mobility	that	displacement	represents	is	out-of-the-ordinary;	and	people	in	the	category	do	not	belong,	may	be	labeled	as	
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dangerous	and	therefore	should	not	be	there.	At	the	same	time,	however,	they	form	an	extremely	important	part	of	the	majority’s	identity;	the	displaced	populations	are	needed	in	order	for	the	nation	state	to	be	preserved	in	the	image	of	the	majority	population.			A	number	of	scholars	have	addressed	the	tension	between	mobility	and	citizenship	(Desforges	et	al.	2005;	Staeheli	et	al.	2012;	Nyers	2015).	We	have	discussed	a	particular	category	of	mobility--that	of	displacement	as	a	result	of	conflict	and	the	associated	understandings	of	belonging	that	comes	with	it.	Displacement	is	embedded	in	particular	norms	of	belonging:	these	norms	are	related	to	discourses	of	return,	belonging	and	the	right	to	mobility	as	well	as	social	status	and	the	right	to	be	present.	Humanitarian	norms	define	a	social	group	as	temporary,	and	analysing	long	term	displacement	through	processes	of	abjection	contributes	to	an	understanding	of	how	mechanisms	of	governing	social	groups	through	aversion	(as	mentioned	above)	takes	place.	Displaced	groups	are	excluded	from	particular	rights,	but	at	the	same	time,	they	are	not	cut	off	from	that	which	excludes	them.	It	is	a	mutual	process	of	being	excluded	and	excluding	oneself	–	becoming	part	of	the	norm	that	excludes	them.			Forced	migrants	help	to	constitute	the	political,	they	are	not	outside	the	law.	While	policies	towards	migrants	often	employ	different	strategies	to	reduce	people	to	abject	inexistence,	it	does	not	only	create	varying	conditions	of	rightlessness	but	also	enable	different	logics	and	acts	of	resistance.	This	resistance	is	possible	to	understand	through	the	hope	embedded	in	the	particular	temporality	that	comes	with	the	categories	of	displacement	and	the	associated	humanitarian	status.	However,	abject	also	helps	to	indicate	the	limits	of	that	political	possibility	which	largely	takes	place	within	the	social	group	of	displaced	people	and	thus,	struggles	to	get	acceptance	beyond	the	limits	of	its	group.			 	
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